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1. The Post-Keynesians and the Problem
In the last two decades, a great deal of attention has been devoted to the question of
probability and uncertainty in Keynes’s General Theory by a group often referred to as the
‘Post-Keynesians’. As I will be making a good deal of use of the researches of this group in
the present paper, I will begin by saying a little in general terms about the group and its ideas.
After the second world war, Keynesian economics became dominant in the British
academic community, and British governments to a large extent followed the advice of
Keynesian economists. Keynesian economics had a similarly important (even if not always
quite so dominant) rôle in other advanced capitalist countries in the same period. During the
1970’s, however, Keynesian economics came under increasing criticism from the monetarist
school, and Keynesian economists began to lose both academic and political influence. In
Britain the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 signalled the end of the government’s use of
Keynesian policies, and the adoption instead of free market policies based on monetarist
economic theory. Many academic economists went over to the new (or rather revived) free
market ideas. However, some remained convinced of the value of Keynesian ideas in
economics.
The remaining followers of Keynes were at this point faced with the unhappy situation
that the academic and political influence of their ideas was declining, and that these ideas were
being increasingly criticized as inadequate. The Post-Keynesians reacted to this crisis in a way
which has parallels in other intellectual schools at a time of difficulty. They argued that the
Keynesian economics which had prevailed in the period 1945-75, and which was now
increasingly being rejected, was not in fact the economics which Keynes himself had proposed
in his General Theory, but rather a simplified and unsatisfactory version of what Keynes had2
said. They suggested that Keynes’s approach could be revived by a return to Keynes’s original
ideas.
The object of the Post-Keynesian attack was the standard text-book account of
Keynesian economics based on Hicks’s IS-LM diagram. Skidelsky explains the origin of this
kind of Keynesianism with characteristic clarity and historical erudition. He writes (1992,
538):
‘The IS-LM diagram, first drawn by John Hicks in 1936, is the General Theory as it has been
taught to economics students ever since: 384 pages of argument whittled down to four
equations and two curves. Hicks, Harrod, Meade and Hansen in America, the leading
constructors of ‘IS-LM’ Keynesianism, had a clear motive: to reconcile Keynesians and non-
Keynesians, so that the ground for policy could be quickly cleared. These early theoretical
models incorporated features which were not at all evident in the magnum opus, but which
conformed more closely to orthodox theory. The constructors of these models also thought
they were improving the original building.’
A little later in a section significantly entitled: ‘Vision into Algebra’, Skidelsky writes (1992,
611):
‘The mathematisation of the General Theory started immediately it was published but
it was left to Hicks to map the mathematics on to a two-curve diagram which became the
accepted form of the General Theory. His famous paper ‘Mr. Keynes and the Classics: A
Suggested Reinterpretation’ was published in Econometrica in April 1937. What Hicks does
is to turn Keynes’s logical chain of reasoning designed to expose the causes which drive the
economy towards a low employment trap into a generalised system of simultaneous equations,
devoid of causal significance, with the behavioural characteristics of the propensities to be
filled in according to assumption. The ‘generalised’ system has room for Keynes’s ‘special
theory’, but also, for example, for the Treasury view, which Keynes wrote the General Theory
to refute.’
IS-LM Keynesianism does not include any reference to probability and uncertainty.
But the Post-Keynesians argue that probability and uncertainty were central to the real Keynes
who wrote a Treatise on Probability in 1921, and in his General Theory of 1936 made implicit
use of probability in his theory of long-term expectation. The Post-Keynesians have
accordingly carried out a great deal of valuable historical research on the evolution of
Keynes’s ideas on probability, and his use of probability in the General Theory.
Post-Keynesianism began in the 1980’s as a reaction to the decline in academic and
political influence of post-war IS-LM Keynesianism. Perhaps the first significant Post-3
Keynesian book was the first volume of Skidelsky’s masterly life of Keynes which appeared in
1983. This covers Keynes’s life up to 1920, and discusses Keynes’s early philosophical work
on probability and induction - a topic which had been ignored for many years. Other Post-
Keynesian books to appear in the 1980’s include Carabelli (1988), Fitzgibbons (1988), and
O’Donnell (1989). In 1985 a collection of papers edited by Lawson and Pesaran appeared.
This contains articles by Victoria Chick, Alexander and Sheila Dow, Tony Lawson, and John
Pheby. Somewhat younger Post-Keynesians include Bateman (1987, 1988, and 1996), Davis
(1994), and Runde (1994, 1996). In what follows I will make use of this Post-Keynesian work
on the reconstruction of Keynes’s ideas.1
Let us now turn to Keynes General Theory of 1936, which I will take in conjunction
with his 1937 article: ‘The General Theory of Employment’, written to summarise and defend
his book. In these works Keynes argues that the amount of investment is the key factor in
determining the performance of the economy as a whole. As we shall see he regards it as the
‘causa causans’ of ‘the level of output and employment as a whole’ (1937, 121). Let us start
therefore with Keynes’s analysis of investment. We shall consider two of the concepts which
Keynes introduces in this connection, namely: prospective yield and demand price of the
investment. Keynes defines these as follows (1936, 135 & 137):
‘When a man buys an investment or capital-asset, he purchases the right to the series of
prospective returns, which he expects to obtain from selling its output, after deducting the
running expenses of obtaining that output, during the life of the asset. This series of annuities
Q1, Q2, ... Qn it is convenient to call the prospective yield of the investment. ...
If Qr is the prospective yield from an asset at time r, and dr is the present value of £1 deferred r
years at the current rate of interest, Qrdr is the demand price of the investment; and
investment will be carried to the point where Qrdr becomes equal to the supply price of the
investment as defined above. If, on the other hand, Qrdr falls short of the supply price, there
will be no current investment in the asset in question.’
So any decision to invest depends crucially on the quantity Qrdr (the demand price of the
investment) which is the sum of the prospective annual yields discounted at the current rate of
interest. But now the crucial problem arises, because the prospective yield Q1, Q2, ... Qn of an
investment is not known, and and consequently Qrdr cannot be calculated. As Keynes puts it
(1936, 149-50):
‘The outstanding fact is the extreme precariousness of the basis of knowledge on which
our estimates of prospective yield have to be made. Our knowledge of the factors which will
govern the yield of an investment some years hence is usually very slight and often negligible.
If we speak frankly, we have to admit that our basis of knowledge for estimating the yield ten4
years hence of a railway, a copper mine, a textile factory, the goodwill of a patent medicine, an
Atlantic liner, a building in the City of London amounts to little and sometimes to nothing; or
even five years hence.’
Since the actual future yields are unknown, they must be replaced in calculating Qrdr
to make an investment decision by expected yields. A decision to invest consequently depends
on what Keynes calls the state of long-term expectation (the title of the famous chapter 12 of
the General Theory). Now the notions of expectation and of probability are interdefinable. If
we take expectation as the starting point, we can define probabilities in terms of expectations,
and vice versa.2 If then Keynes is using the notion of expectation in its standard sense, he is
implicitly operating with a concept of probability, and it is natural to ask what should be the
interpretation of the probabilities involved. This then brings us to the fundamental question
with which this paper is concerned, namely: ‘what is the most appropriate interpretation of
probability in Keynes’s General Theory?’ The Post-Keynesians have devoted a great deal of
attention to this problem, but, before we can consider their arguments in detail, it will be
necessary to give a brief explanation of the various interpretations of probability.
3
2. The Logical, Subjective, and Intersubjective Interpretations of Probability
Different versions of the logical interpretation of probability have been developed by
different authors, but here, naturally, we will be concerned with Keynes’s version as
expounded in his 1921 Treatise on Probability. In the case of deductive logic a conclusion is
entailed by the premises, and is certain given those premises. Thus, if our premises are that all
ravens are black, and George is a raven, it follows with certainty that George is black. But
now let us consider an inductive, rather than deductive, case. Suppose our premises are the
evidence (e say) that several thousand ravens have been observed, and that they were all black.
Suppose further that we are considering the hypothesis (h say) that all ravens are black, or the
prediction (d say) that the next observed raven will be black. Hume argued, and this is in
agreement with modern logic, that neither h nor d follow logically from e. Yet even though e
does not entail either h or d, could we not say that e partially entails h and d, since e surely
gives some support for these conclusions? This line of thought suggests that there might be a
logical theory of partial entailment which generalises the ordinary theory of full entailment
which is found in deductive logic. This is the starting point of Keynes’s approach to
probability. He writes (1921, 52):
‘Inasmuch as it is always assumed that we can sometimes judge directly that a conclusion
follows from a premiss, it is no great extension of this assumption to suppose that we can
sometimes recognise that a conclusion partially follows from, or stands in a relation of
probability to a premiss.’5
So a probability is the degree of a partial entailment. Keynes further makes the
assumption that if e partially entails h to degree p, then, given e, it is rational to believe h to
degree p. For Keynes probability is degree of rational belief not simply degree of belief. As
he says (1921, 4):
‘ ... in the sense important to logic, probability is not subjective. It is not, that is to say, subject
to human caprice. A proposition is not probable because we think it so. When once the facts
are given which determine our knowledge, what is probable or improbable in these
circumstances has been fixed objectively, and is independent of our opinion. The Theory of
Probability is logical, therefore, because it is concerned with the degree of belief which it is
rational to entertain in given conditions, and not merely with the actual beliefs of particular
individuals, which may or may not be rational.’
Here Keynes speaks of probabilities as being fixed objectively, but he is not using objective to
refer to things in the material world. He means objective in the Platonic sense, referring to
something in a supposed Platonic world of abstract ideas.
The next question which might be asked regarding Keynes’s approach is the following:
‘how do we obtain knowledge about this logical relation of probability?’ Keynes’s answer is
that we get to know at least some probability relations by direct acquaintance or immediate
logical intuition. As Keynes says (1921, 13): ‘We pass from a knowledge of the proposition a
to a knowledge about the proposition b by perceiving a logical relation between them. With
this logical relation we have direct acquaintance.’
A problem which arises on this account is how we can ever assign numerical values to
probabilities. Keynes indeed thinks that this is possible only in some cases, and writes on this
point (1921, 41): ‘In order that numerical measurement may be possible, we must be given a
number of equally probable alternatives.’ So in order to get numerical probabilities we have to
be able to judge that a number of cases are equally probable and to enable us to make this
judgement we need an a priori principle. This a priori principle is called by Keynes the
Principle of Indifference, and he gives the following statement of it (1921, 42):
‘The Principle of Indifference asserts that if there is no known reason for predicating of
our subject one rather than another of several alternatives, then relatively to such knowledge
the assertions of each of these alternatives have an equal probability.’
Unfortunately the Principle of Indifference leads to a number of paradoxes. Keynes gives a
full account of these in chapter IV of his Treatise, and makes an attempt to solve them. Yet is
has to be said that his solution is far from satisfactory. This concludes my brief account of6
Keynes’s version of the logical theory of probability. Let us now turn to the subjective
interpretation.
The subjective theory of probability was discovered independently and at about the
same time by Frank Ramsey in England, and Bruno de Finetti in Italy. Their two versions of
the theory are broadly similar, though there are important differences which are well described
in Galavotti (1991). In what follows I will concentrate mainly on Ramsey since his work is
directly connected with that of Keynes.
Ramsey was a younger contemporary of Keynes at Cambridge. His fundamental paper
introducing the subjective approach to probability was read to the Moral Sciences Club at
Cambridge, and Ramsey begins the paper by criticizing Keynes’s views on probability.
According to Keynes there are logical relations of probability between pairs of propositions,
and these can be in some sense perceived. Ramsey criticizes this as follows (1926, 161):
‘But let us now return to a more fundamental criticism of Mr. Keynes’ views, which is
the obvious one that there really do not seem to be any such things as the probability relations
he describes. He supposes that, at any rate in certain cases, they can be perceived; but
speaking for myself I feel confident that this is not true. I do not perceive them, and if I am to
be persuaded that they exist it must be by argument; moreover I shrewdly suspect that others
do not perceive them either, because they are able to come to so very little agreement as to
which of them relates any two given propositions.’
This is an interesting case of an argument which gains in strength from the nature of the person
who proposes it. Had a less distinguished logician than Ramsey objected that he was unable to
perceive any logical relations of probability, Keynes might have replied that this was merely a
sign of logical incompetence, or logical blindness. Indeed Keynes does say (1921, 18): ‘Some
men - indeed it is obviously the case - may have a greater power of logical intuition than
others.’ Ramsey, however, was such a brilliant mathematical logician that Keynes could not
have claimed with plausibility that Ramsey was lacking in the capacity for logical intuition or
perception - and Keynes did not in fact do so.
In the logical interpretation, the probability of h given e is identified with the rational
degree of belief which someone, who had evidence e, would accord to h. This rational degree
of belief is considered to be the same for all rational individuals. The subjective interpretation
of probability abandons the assumption of rationality leading to consensus. According to the
subjective theory different individuals (Ms A, Mr B and Master C say). although all perfectly
reasonable and having the same evidence e, may yet have different degrees of belief in h.
Probability is thus defined as the degree of belief of a particular individual, so that we should7
really not speak of the probability, but rather of Ms A’s probability, Mr B’s probability, or
Master C’s probability.
Now the mathematical theory of probability takes probabilities to be numbers in the
interval [0, 1]. So, if the subjective theory is to be an adequate interpretation of the
mathematical calculus, a way must be found of measuring the degree of belief of an individual
that some event (E say) will occur. Thus we want to be able to measure, for example, Mr B’s
degree of belief that it will rain tomorrow in London, that a particular political party will win
the next election, and so on. How can this be done? Ramsey argues (1926, 172): ‘The old-
established way of measuring a person’s belief is to propose a bet, and see what are the lowest
odds which he will accept. This method I regard as fundamentally sound; ...’ Ramsey
defends this betting approach as follows (1926, 183):
‘ ... this section ... is based fundamentally on betting, but this will not seem unreasonable when
it is seen that all our lives we are in a sense betting. Whenever we go to the station we are
betting that a train will really run, and if we had not a sufficient degree of belief in this we
should decline the bet and stay at home.’
The betting approach to probability can be made precise as follows. Let us imagine that
Ms A (a psychologist) wants to measure the degree of belief of Mr B in some event E. To do
so, she gets Mr B to agree to bet with her on E, under the following conditions. Mr B has to
choose a number q (called his betting quotient on E), and then Ms A chooses the stake S. Mr
B pays Ms A qS in exchange for S if E occurs. S can be positive or negative, but S must be
small in relation to Mr B’s wealth. Under these circumstances q is taken to be a measure of
Mr B’s degree of belief in E.
If Mr B has to bet on a number of events E1, ... , En, his betting quotients are said to be
coherent if and only if Ms A cannot choose stakes S1, ... , Sn such that she wins whatever
happens. If Ms A can choose stakes so that she wins whatever happens, she is said to have
made a Dutch Book against Mr B.
It is taken as obvious that Mr B will want his bets to be coherent, that is to say he will
want to avoid the possibility of his losing whatever happens. Surprisingly this condition is
both necessary and sufficient for betting quotients to satisfy the axioms of probability. This is
the content of the following theorem.
The Ramsey-De Finetti Theorem
A set of betting quotients is coherent if and only if they satisfy the axioms of probability.8
This theorem gives a rigorous foundation to the subjective theory of probability. The
chain of reasoning is close knit and ingenious. The first general idea is to measure degrees of
belief by betting. This is made precise by introducing betting quotients. What is known as the
Dutch Book argument then shows that for betting quotients to be coherent, they must satisfy
the axioms of probability and so can be regarded as probabilities.
Let us now turn to the intersubjective interpretation of probability.4 The subjective
theory is concerned with degrees of belief of particular individuals. However this abstracts
from the fact that many, if not most, of our beliefs are social in character. They are held in
common by nearly all members of a social group, and a particular individual usually acquires
them through social interactions with this group. If we accept Kuhn’s analysis (1962) then this
applies to many of the beliefs of scientists. According to Kuhn, the scientific experts working
in a particular area, nearly all accept a paradigm, which contains a set of theories and factual
propositions. These theories and propositions are thus believed by nearly all the members of
this group of scientific experts. A new recruit to the group is trained to know and accept the
paradigm as a condition for entry to the group. Much the same considerations apply to other
social groups such as religious sects, political parties and so on. These groups have common
beliefs which an individual usually acquires through joining the group. It is actually quite
difficult for individuals to resist accepting the dominant beliefs of a group of which they form
part, though of course dissidents and heretics do occur. One striking instance of this is that
individuals kidnapped by a terrorist organisation do sometimes, like Patty Hearst, adopt the
terrorists’ beliefs. All this seems to indicate that as well as the specific beliefs of a particular
individual, there are the consensus beliefs of social groups. Indeed the latter may be more
fundamental than the former. What will be shown next is that these consensus beliefs can be
treated as probabilities through an extension of the Dutch Book argument.
Earlier we imagined that Ms A (a psychologist) wanted to measure the degree of belief
of Mr B in some event E. To do so, she gets Mr B to agree to bet with her on E, under the
following conditions. Mr B has to choose a number q (called his betting quotient on E), and
then Ms A chooses the stake S. Mr B pays Ms A qS in exchange for S if E occurs. S can be
positive or negative, but |S| must be small in relation to Mr B’s wealth. Under these
circumstances q is taken to be a measure of Mr B’s degree of belief in E.
In order to extend this to social groups, we can retain our psychologist Ms A, but we
should replace Mr B by a set B = (B1, B2, ... , Bn) of individuals. We then have the following
theorem.9
Theorem. Suppose Ms A is betting against B = (B1, B2, ... , Bn) on event E. Suppose Bi
chooses betting quotient qi. Ms A will be able to choose stakes so that she gains money from
B whatever happens unless q1 = q2 = ... = qn.
Informally what this theorem shows is the following. Let B be some social group.
Then it is in the interest of B as a whole if its members agree, perhaps as a result of rational
discussion, on a common betting quotient rather than each member of the group choosing his
or her own betting quotient. If a group does in fact agree on a common betting quotient, this
will be called the intersubjective or consensus probability of the social group. This type of
probability can then be contrasted with the subjective or personal probability of a particular
individual.
The Dutch book argument used to introduce intersubjective probability shows that if
the group agrees on a common betting quotient, this protects them against a cunning opponent
betting against them. This then is a particular mathematical case of an old piece of folk
wisdom, the claim, namely, that solidarity within a group protects it against an outside enemy.
This point of view is expressed in many traditional maxims and stories. A recent example
occurs in Kurosawa’s film Seven Samurai. In one particular scene Kambei the leader of the
samurai is urging the villagers to act together to repel the coming attack by bandits. ‘This is a
rule of war.’ he says ‘Collective defence protects the individual. Individual defence destroys
the individual.’
One helpful way of regarding the intersubjective interpretation of probability is to see it
as intermediate between the logical interpretation of the early Keynes, and the subjective
interpretation of his critic Ramsey. According to the early Keynes, there exists a single
rational degree of belief in some conclusion c given evidence e. If this were really so, we
would expect nearly all human beings to have this single rational degree of belief in c given e,
since, after all, most human beings are rational. Yet in very many cases different individuals
come to quite different conclusions even though they have the same background knowledge
and expertise in the relevant area, and even though they are all quite rational. A single rational
degree of belief on which all rational human beings should agree seems to be a myth.
So much for the logical interpretation of probability, but the subjective view of
probability does not seem to be entirely satisfactory either. Degree of belief is not an entirely
personal or individual matter. We very often find an individual human being belonging to a
group which shares a common outlook, has some degree of common interest, and is able to
reach a consensus as regards its beliefs. Obvious examples of such groups would be religious
sects, political parties, or schools of thought regarding various scientific questions. For such
groups the concept of intersubjective probability seems to be the appropriate one. These
groups may be small or large, but usually they fall short of embracing the whole of humanity.10
The intersubjective probability of such a group is thus intermediate between a degree of
rational belief (the early Keynes) and a degree of subjective belief (Ramsey).
The three views we have considered so far have in common that they regard probability
as a measure of human belief, whether it is degree of rational belief, degree of individual
belief, or the degree of a consensus belief of a group. Such theories are called epistemological
theories of probability, and they can be contrasted with objective theories of probability. Here
objective does not, as in Keynes, mean objective in the Platonic sense, but rather in the sense
of belonging to the objective material or physical world. The probability of a radioactive atom
disintegrating in a year is an example of an objective probability in this sense. It is an
objective feature of the physical world, and does not depend on human beliefs. Such objective
probabilities are to be found in the natural sciences in situations where we have a set of
repeatable conditions.
This concludes my brief survey of some main interpretations of probability. Let us
now see how these views might be applied to Keynes’s economics.
3. Probability in Keynes’s Theory of Long-Term Expectation
In his Treatise of 1921 Keynes advocated the logical interpretation of probability as
degree of rational belief. Should we therefore adopt the natural supposition that he is
implicitly using this logical interpretation of probability in the General Theory? Or are there
reasons for thinking that Keynes changed his views on probability between 1921 and 1936?
These questions have been the subject of a fascinating debate among the Post-Keynesians.
One point of view is the continuity thesis that Keynes held much the same view of probability
throughout his life. This thesis is advocated by (among others) Lawson (1985), Carabelli
(1988), and O’Donnell (1989). Opposed to this is the discontinuity thesis that Keynes changed
his views on the interpretation of probability significantly between 1921 and 1936. This thesis
is advocated by Bateman (1987 & 1996), and Davis (1994). I am in favour of the discontinuity
thesis, and will next present the main arguments in its favour.
As far as the interpretation of probability is concerned, a most important intellectual
event took place between 1921 and 1936. As we have seen in the previous section, Ramsey in
his 1926 paper ‘Truth and Probability’ subjected Keynes’s logical interpretation of probability
to an extensive criticism. There is strong evidence that Keynes, who had the greatest respect
for Ramsey, took this criticism very seriously, and altered his views on probability in the light
of Ramsey’s objections.11
Ramsey died in 1930 at the age of only 26, and Keynes paid a tribute in Chapter 29 of
his 1933 Essays in Biography to this remarkable Cambridge philosopher, mathematician, and
economist. This is what Keynes says about Ramsey’s treatment of probability (1933, 338-9):
‘Ramsey argues, as against the view which I had put forward, that probability is concerned not
with objective relations between propositions but (in some sense) with degrees of belief, and
he succeeds in showing that the calculus of probabilities simply amounts to a set of rules for
ensuring that the system of degrees of belief which we hold shall be a consistent system. Thus
the calculus of probabilities belongs to formal logic. But the basis of our degrees of belief - or
the a priori probabilities, as they used to be called - is part of our human outfit, perhaps given
us merely by natural selection, analogous to our perceptions and our memories rather than to
formal logic. So far I yield to Ramsey - I think he is right. But in attempting to distinguish
‘rational’ degrees of belief from belief in general he was not yet, I think, quite successful.’
We see that Keynes was prepared to yield to Ramsey on a number of points, but yet did
not agree with Ramsey about everything. Bateman in his interesting 1987 article on ‘Keynes’s
Changing Conception of Probability' argues that Keynes did adopt the subjective interpretation
of probability. After quoting the above passage from Keynes, he writes (1987, 107): ‘While
he (i.e. Keynes - D.G.) had originally advocated an objective epistemic theory of probability in
A Treatise on Probability he was now willing to accept a subjective epistemic theory.’
I agree with Bateman that Keynes abandoned the logical interpretation of probability,
but I will argue that Keynes moved towards an intersubjective epistemic theory rather than a
subjective epistemic theory of the kind advocated by Ramsey. Intersubjective probability is in
fact closer to Keynes’s original position, for, as I argued in the previous section, the
intersubjective probability of a group is intermediate between a degree of rational belief (the
early Keynes) and a degree of subjective belief (Ramsey).
Before discussing intersubjective probability in this context, however, I will present a
further piece of evidence that Keynes did abandon the logical interpretation of probability in
his General Theory. As we saw earlier, Keynes’s version of the logical interpretation of
probability makes use of what he called the Principle of Indifference. Admittedly Keynes does
give a full discussion of the paradoxes to which this Principle leads, and he is not very
successful in resolving these paradoxes. Yet in his 1921 Treatise on Probability, he still
regards the Principle of Indifference as essential for probability theory, as the following
remarks about it show (Keynes, 1921, 87):
‘On the grounds both of its own intuitive plausibility and of that of some of the conclusions for
which it is necessary, we are inevitably led towards this principle as a necessary basis for12
judgments of probability. In some sense, judgments of probability do seem to be based on
equally balanced degrees of ignorance.’
By contrast, in the General Theory, Keynes wrote (1936, 152):
‘Nor can we rationalise our behaviour by arguing that to a man in a state of ignorance errors in
either direction are equally probable, so that there remains a mean actuarial expectation based
on equi-probabilities. For it can easily be shown that the assumption of arithmetically equal
probabilities based on a state of ignorance leads to absurdities.’
This amounts to a complete repudiation of the Principle of Indifference, and it is interesting to
note that Keynes may here be echoing Ramsey who wrote (1926, 189):
‘To be able to turn the Principle of Indifference out of formal logic is a great advantage; for it
is fairly clearly impossible to lay down purely logical conditions for its validity, as is attempted
by Mr Keynes.’
All this establishes that Keynes did abandon his logical interpretation of probability in
the light of Ramsey’s criticisms. But what interpretation of probability is then appropriate for
Keynes’s use of expectation in the General Theory? I think we can obtain an answer to this
question through an analysis of Keynes’s views on long-term expectation, as set out in his
1936 and 1937.
In his 1937, Keynes argues that our knowledge of the future yields of investments is
‘uncertain’ in a sense which he distinguishes from ‘probable’. This is what he says (1937,
113-14):
‘By ‘uncertain’ knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to distinguish what is
known for certain from what is only probable. The game of roulette is not subject, in this
sense, to uncertainty; nor is the prospect of a Victory bond being drawn. Or, again, the
expectation of life is only slightly uncertain. Even the weather is only moderately uncertain.
The sense in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of a European war is
uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the
obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of private wealth owners in the social system
in 1970. About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable
probability whatever. We simply do not know. Nevertheless, the necessity for action and for
decision compels us as practical men to do our best to overlook this awkward fact and to
behave exactly as we should if we had behind us a good Benthamite calculation of a series of
prospective advantages and disadvantages, each multiplied by its appropriate probability,
waiting to be summed.’13
Keynes here uses ‘uncertain’ in the same sense as Knight, who in 1921 had
distinguished between risk and uncertainty. Knight put the point as follows (1921, 233):
‘The practical difference between the two categories, risk and uncertainty, is that in the former
the distribution of the outcome in a group of instances is known (either through calculation a
priori or from statistics of past experience), while in the case of uncertainty that is not true, the
reason being in general that it is impossible to form a group of instances, because the situation
dealt with is in a high degree unique.’
Keynes next asks, regarding situations of uncertainty in the above sense, (1937, 114):
‘How do we manage in such circumstances to behave in a manner which saves our faces as
rational, economic men?’ He answers this question by saying that we resort to ‘a variety of
techniques’ of which the most important is the following (1937, 114):
‘Knowing that our own individual judgment is worthless, we endeavour to fall back on the
judgement of the rest of the world which is perhaps better informed. That is, we endeavour to
conform with the behaviour of the majority or the average. The psychology of a society of
individuals each of whom is endeavouring to copy the others leads to what we may strictly
term a conventional judgment.’
Keynes’s point is that because of lack of information and because of the general uncertainty of
the future, entrepreneurs cannot form a rational expectation, which then determines their
investment decisions. As a result, their expectation is largely conventional, and because of
this, it is subject to waves of optimism or pessimism, the general state, that is of the famous
animal spirits, which Keynes describes as follows (1936, 161-2):
‘ ... there is the instability due to the characteristic of human nature that a large proportion of
our positive activities depend on spontaneous optimism rather than on a mathematical
expectation, whether moral or hedonistic or economic. Most, probably, of our decisions to do
something positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come,
can only be taken as a result of animal spirits - of a spontaneous urge to action rather than
inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by
quantitative probabilities. ... Thus if the animal spirits are dimmed and the spontaneous
optimism falters, leaving us to depend on nothing but a mathematical expectation, enterprise
will fade and die; - though fears of loss may have a basis no more reasonable than hopes of
profit had before.’
Keynes does not postulate, as a strict follower of Ramsey might have done, that each
entrepreneur forms his or her own individual expectation which differs from that of every14
other entrepreneur. On the contrary, the entrepreneurs imitate each other so that the group
comes to have more or less the same expectation. However this expectation is not based on a
rational assessment, but depends on factors like the state of the animal spirits. What we are
dealing with is the intersubjective degree of belief of a group of entrepreneurs, which, through
a process of social interaction, reaches a consensus. Keynes’s long-term expectation is the
intersubjective expectation of a group of entrepreneurs, and implicitly involves the notion of
intersubjective probability.
This view is reinforced by the way Keynes sees the role of expert professionals who
deal in stock market investments (1936, 154):
‘ ... most of these persons are, in fact, largely concerned, not with making superior long-term
forecasts of the probable yield of an investment over its whole life, but with foreseeing
changes in the conventional basis of valuation a short time ahead of the general public. They
are concerned, not with what an investment is really worth to a man who buys it ‘for keeps’,
but with what the market will value it at, under the influence of mass psychology, three months
or a year hence.’
Although intersubjective probability is largely an explication of what Keynes says, I
think that it does improve on Keynes’s position at one point. Both Keynes and Knight seem to
assume that uncertainty is a qualitative concept which cannot be quantified, but, if we use the
method of betting quotients and the Dutch book argument, we can quantify uncertainty and
treat it using the standard mathematical theory of probability. To see this, let us consider two
of Keynes’s examples of uncertainty, namely (1937, 113): ‘the price of copper and the rate of
interest twenty years hence’. Although it is obviously very uncertain what the rate of interest
will be in twenty years’ time, there is nothing to prevent us getting a particular individual, or a
social group, to propose a betting quotient on this price lying in a specified interval in twenty
years’ time. Thus we can by the standard Dutch book procedure introduce probability
distributions for the rate of interest in twenty years’ time. These probabilities will, however,
be subjective (or intersubjective), and not objective. Thus we can say that uncertainty in the
sense of Keynes and Knight can be handled using subjective (or intersubjective) probabilities
based on betting; while Knight’s risk corresponds to an objective probability.
This analysis in fact accords quite well with what Keynes and Knight themselves say.
Keynes says about examples such as the rate of interest in twenty years’ time (1937, 113):
‘About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability
whatever.’ (my italics - D. G.) Certainly there is no scientific basis to form a calculable
probability, and so we cannot have an objective probability, but there is nothing to prevent
individuals (or groups) betting, and so forming a subjective (or intersubjective) probability.
Knight associates risk with situations in which (1921, 233) ‘the distribution of the outcome in15
a group of instances is known’, and claims that uncertainty occurs when (1921, 233) ‘it is
impossible to form a group of instances, because the situation dealt with is in a high degree
unique.’ This concurs exactly with the position that objective probabilities (corresponding to
Knight’s risks) should be associated with sets of repeatable conditions, while single events, not
uniquely characterised by a set of repeatable conditions, can only be assigned probabilities in
the sense of degrees of belief. Indeed Knight does actually say (1921, 233):
‘We can also employ the terms “objective” and “subjective” probability to designate the risk
and uncertainty respectively, as these expressions are already in general use with a
signification akin to that proposed.’
Knight was writing in 1921 before Ramsey and De Finetti had developed the method of
betting quotients for making subjective probabilities measurable, and the Dutch book
argument for handling these subjective probabilities using the standard mathematical theory of
probability. It was thus natural for Knight to think of subjective probability in his sense, i.e.
uncertainty, as (1921, 46): ‘indeterminate, unmeasurable’. This is no longer necessary today.
Thus we can take subjective (or intersubjective) probability to correspond to the
uncertainty of Keynes and Knight, and objective probability to correspond to Knight’s risk.
There are advantages in so doing, since it avoids the need to use any concepts which cannot be
handled by the ordinary mathematical calculus of probability. One qualification is needed,
however.5 Knight’s risk does not correspond to a situation in which an objective probability
exists, but to one in which the value of this objective probability is known. There might be a
case in which there is an objective probability, whose value is not known, perhaps because of a
lack of statistical data. Such a situation would be one of uncertainty in the sense of Knight and
Keynes, that is to say, in our analysis, a situation in which use would have to be made of a
subjective or intersubjective, but not objective, probability.
4. Some Concluding Remarks in favour of the Post-Keynesians
I will conclude this section by observing that Keynes’s 1937 paper from which I have
quoted quite extensively provides very strong evidence in favour of the Post-Keynesian
interpretation of Keynes’s economics. Keynes states that the aim of the paper is to summarise
the main ideas of his book, and to explain the principal points in which his theory differs from
the standard economics of his time. Keynes indeed characterises what he calls ‘orthodox
theory’ or ‘classical economic theory’ as a view held in common by recent authors such
Edgeworth and Pigou, and their predecessors such as Ricardo and Marshall. He then explains
the first point in which he diverges from this tradition as follows (1937, 112):16
‘But these more recent writers like their predecessors were still dealing with a system in which
the amount of the factors employed was given and the other relevant facts were known more or
less for certain. This does not mean that they were dealing with a system in which change was
ruled out, or even one in which the disappointment of expectation was ruled out. But at any
given time facts and expectations were assumed to be given in a definite and calculable form;
and risks, of which, though admitted, not much notice was taken, were supposed to be capable
of an exact actuarial computation. The calculus of probability, though mention of it was kept
in the background, was supposed to be capable of reducing uncertainty to the same calculable
status as that of certainty itself; ...’
Keynes then goes on to observe that (1937, 113) ‘we have, as a rule, only the vaguest
idea of any but the most direct consequences of our acts.’ This may not matter for most of our
actions, but is important for the accumulation of wealth, which is concerned with a
comparatively distant, or even indefinitely distant future. Keynes concludes (1937, 113):
‘Thus the fact that our knowledge of the future is fluctuating, vague and uncertain, renders
wealth a peculiarly unsuitable subject for the methods of the classical economic theory.’
All this gives strong support to the Post-Keynesian interpretation. When Keynes sets
out to explain how his theory differs from that of the orthodox theorists, the very first point
which he emphasizes is that he takes account of uncertainty which they fail to do. The Post-
Keynesians are thus correct to emphasize the crucial importance of uncertainty in Keynes’s
economics, and to criticize IS-LM Keynesianism for failing to mention, let alone discuss,
uncertainty.
Keynes devotes section II of his 1937 paper to the question of uncertainty, and it is
only in section III that he mentions effective demand, which he describes as (1937, 119) ‘my
next difference from the traditional theory.’ Moreover in his treatment of effective demand,
the issues connected with uncertainty, far from being forgotten, are strongly emphasized.
Keynes divides effective demand into investment expenditure and consumption expenditure,
but he then argues that it is investment expenditure which is the crucial factor in determining
the performance of the system as a whole. This is because consumption expenditure is a fairly
simple function of aggregate income, whereas investment expenditure is liable to violent
fluctuations owing to uncertainty about the future. It is thus the considerations regarding
uncertainty which lead Keynes to regarding the level of investment as playing the most
important rôle in determining how well or badly the economy as a whole functions. This is
how he summarizes the argument (1937, 121):
‘The theory can be summed up by saying that, given the psychology of the public, the
level of output and employment as a whole depends on the amount of investment. I put it in
this way, not because this is the only factor on which aggregate output depends, but because it17
is usual in a complex system to regard as the causa causans that factor which is most prone to
sudden and wide fluctuation. More comprehensively, aggregate output depends on the
propensity to hoard, on the policy of the monetary authority as it affects the quantity of money,
on the state of confidence concerning the prospective yield of capital assets, on the propensity
to spend and on the social factors which influence the level of the money wage. But of these
several factors it is those which determine the rate of investment which are most unreliable,
since it is they which are influenced by our views of the future about which we know so little.
This that I offer is, therefore, a theory of why output and employment are so liable to
fluctuation.’
So Keynes was not a Keynesian, though he may have been a Post-Keynesian!18
Notes
1. The term ‘Post-Keynesianism’ is rather vague, and not everyone would use it in the
way adopted here. Indeed several of those whom I have included in the group might
deny that they are Post-Keynesians. I am certainly using the term ‘Post-Keynesian’ in
a broad sense to cover a number of authors with very different views on economics and
politics. The right wing of the Post-Keynesians is represented by Skidelsky who holds
that Keynes’s ideas, though very interesting and important historically, are no longer
applicable in the changed conditions of today. The left wing of the group, on the other
hand, favour an integration of Keynes with Marx, and very left-wing policies.
2. In the General Theory, Keynes does use the terms ‘uncertain’ and ‘uncertainty’ quite
often. He does also sometimes, though not often, use the word ‘probability’.
Characteristically, however, he speaks of ‘expectation’ rather than ‘probability’. Now
in standard probability theory, expectation can be defined in terms of probability, and
vice versa. Suppose, for example, that a random variable X can take on the values a1,
a2, ... , an, with probabilities p1, p2, ... , pn. Then the expectation of X, E(X) = a1p1
+ a2p2 + ... + anpn. Similar definitions can be given for random variables with more
complicated distributions. Conversely let A be an event. We can define the indicator
of A by
Y() = 1 if A
Y() = 0 if ¬ (A)
Then Y is a random variable, and the probability of A, P(A) = E(Y). Indeed one can
develop probability by introducing expectation as the primitive concept which appears
in the axioms, and defining probability in terms of expectation. For these reasons, I
will assume that when Keynes speaks of expectation, he is making an implicit
reference to probability. However, it was suggested to me by Tomohide Suzuki that
Keynes may be using expectation in a non-standard sense which is not definable in
terms of probability. This suggestion leads to a different interpretation of Keynes’s
writings which seems to me worth exploring, but which I will not consider further in
the present paper.
3. For more detailed accounts of the various interpretations, see Gillies (2000).19
4. What follows is an informal sketch of the intersubjective interpretation of probability.
A more detailed account with full proofs of the relevant theorems is contained in
Gillies and Ietto-Gillies (1991). This is a joint paper written with my wife who is
Professor of Applied Economics at the University of South Bank, London. The theory
of intersubjective probability as applied to economics was worked out by the two of us
together. An account of the theory is also to be found in Gillies (2000, 169-180).
5. This point was made to me by Jon Williamson in an informal discussion.20
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